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Abstract This article asserts that the impact of generational replacement on gen-
dered political participation patterns is not sufficiently taken into account by
existing analyses of participatory gender inequalities. In this longitudinal study,
gender and generational differences in French protest patterns are systematically
examined. The article tackles two interrelated questions: what is the impact of
generational replacement on gender differences in political action in France, and
from an individual-level perspective, how do we explain the different participation
levels from different generations of women and men? A longitudinal quantitative
analysis of survey data from the European Values Study from 1981 to 2008 con-
firms the significance of generational differences as well as the multi-dimensionality
of participatory gender differences.
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Introduction
In contemporary France, as in most advanced Western democracies, a new cohort of
female political participants has been socialised in societies with drastically
increasing levels of education, increasing degrees of female labour market
participation, more egalitarian gender roles, and where politics is not just a man’s
business anymore. Considering these dramatic societal changes, I wonder if the
variable ‘‘gender’’ still represents a significant predictor of different levels of
participation among younger cohorts. Indeed, as existing empirical evidence has
shown, despite considerable gains in terms of gender equality in education, labour
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force participation, and citizenship rights, women are still slightly though
consistently less likely to engage in certain forms of political participation than
men in most advanced Western democracies (Burns et al. 2001; Norris 2002; Norris
et al. 2004; Dalton 2008; Coffe´ and Bolzendahl 2010). Therefore, the so-called
gender gap has turned out to be much more persistent in some forms of political
participation than originally suggested by scholars (Mossuz-Lavau and Sineau 1983;
Schlozman et al. 1994; Conway 2001). They claimed that these participatory gender
inequalities would gradually disappear with women’s increasing levels of education
and participation in the workforce. Without doubt, these persisting participatory
gender inequalities are more puzzling than ever and may thus need to be
reconsidered. This article claims that studies on gendered participation patterns have
not paid sufficient attention to the significance of generational replacement for the
evolution of participatory gender inequalities. On the one hand, this comes from the
fact that most research relies on a cross-sectional research design, focusing only on
data at one point in time and thus representing only a snapshot of participatory
gender inequalities. On the other hand, this also steems from the greater attention
given to age effects—in contrast to cohort effects—in political behaviour research.
The scarcity of longitudinal analyses on participatory gender differences
contributes to an ignorance of variation within the category of gender. In this article,
gender refers to the socially constructed roles and learned behaviours of women and
men associated with the biological characteristics of females and males (see Oakley
1972). Women’s roles evolved over time, and important factors of politicisation
influence more and more groups of women (see Le Hay and Mossuz-Lavau 2010).
Different cohorts of women have been socialised in very contrasting environments
regarding the existence of gender equality in the political, economic and social realms.
In turn, this might influence the development of different political attitudes and
behaviours. I argue that time, and more specifically generational replacement, should
be taken more seriously and more deeply investigated to capture the evolution of
gender inequalities in political participation levels. If women from more recent
cohorts consistently acquire the deeper necessary predispositions for political action
thanks to their educational attainments, labour market participation, and higher
psychological political involvement, they might become as politically active as men.
Thus, this article aims to analyse and respond to a twofold research question:
first, do we see narrowing gender differences in political action over time and across
succeeding birth cohorts? Second, how can we explain participatory gender
inequalities across different birth cohorts from an individual-level perspective?
Building upon Inglehart and Norris (2003) revised modernisation theory, I
theoretically tackle these questions by adding a generational component to existing
explanations of participatory gender inequalities. Empirically, I use longitudinal
data from the European Values Study (EVS) to focus on the evolution of
participatory gender differences concerning three distinct types of political action
over time, namely demonstrating, signing petitions, and boycotting.1
1 Past research has shown that these different political acts do not build a uniform dimension in every
country (Teorell et al. 2007a). This justifies the choice of this article not to integrate all three items into an
overall scale of non-institutional political participation.
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The first section of the article provides a brief review of the literature on
participatory gender inequalities after which theoretical expectations will be
derived. The second section justifies the selection of the case of France for the
analysis of gendered patterns in political action. Data, operationalisation and
methodological aspects are then discussed. Descriptive statistics on the evolution of
gender differences in political action in France as well as the results of the
multivariate analyses will be presented and critically discussed afterwards. The last
section offers concluding remarks and new avenues for further research.
Gender, time, and political participation
Research shows that gender inequalities in political participation vary depending on
the type of political activity (e.g. Burns et al. 2001; Hooghe and Stolle 2004; Marien
et al. 2010; Coffe´ and Bolzendahl 2010). Indeed, a more careful analysis of women’s
political engagement asserts its conditionality depending on how individuals
distinguish between different forms of political participation. In fact, while women
and men nowadays vote at similar rates in most established European and other
advanced democracies (see, for example, Conway 2001; Gallego 2007; Coffe´ and
Bolzendahl 2010), gender inequalities in other forms of political engagement persist.
Several studies show that on the one hand, women generally participate less in the
more formal and state-centred institutional acts of political participation, such as
engaging in campaign and party-related activism (Conway 2001; Burns et al. 2001;
Norris et al. 2004; Teorell et al. 2007b; Coffe´ and Bolzendahl 2010; Marien et al.
2010). On the other hand, research also reveals that with regard to some non-
institutional forms of participation, i.e. more informal, private and less visible acts
such as political consumerism or signing petitions, women are more likely to be
active than men (Stolle and Hooghe 2011; Stolle et al. 2005; Stolle and Micheletti
2006; Gallego 2007; Teorell et al. 2007b; Coffe´ and Bolzendahl 2010; Marien et al.
2010; Stolle and Hooghe 2011). These studies have enlarged their definition of
political participation and unveiled some reversed gender gaps in extra-institutional
forms of political participation.2 There seems to be a ‘‘women-friendly’’ way (Stolle
et al. 2005) of participating, at least in some countries.
Most research on participatory gender inequalities encompasses single-year
studies (Morales 1999; Burns et al. 2001, Hooghe and Stolle 2004; Norris et al.
2004; Baum and Santo 2007; Desposato and Norrander 2008; Coffe´ and Bolzendahl
2010; Coffe´ 2013). Consequently, many of these studies merely offer a snapshot of
gender inequalities in political action for a specific year. Moreover, only a few focus
on differences of the magnitude of participatory gender inequalities across
generations. Hence, there is very little empirical evidence on this issue. In their
pooled analysis of post-industrial nations, Inglehart and Norris (2003) find smaller
2 In view of the reported variance in forms and sizes of participatory gender inequalities, this article
refrains from using the term ‘‘gender gap’’. More importantly, it questions its analytical usefulness. The
term ‘‘gender gap’’ not only omits the fact that women tend to participate differently than men but it is
also a ‘‘catch-all term’’ that stands for many other gendered patterns of political behaviours or attitudes as
well as economic inequalities between women and men.
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gender differences among post-war generations in the case of civic and political
activism. The results from Coffe´’s descriptive analyses (2013) similarly point to
smaller gender differences among the two youngest cohorts in Western and Eastern
Europe in terms of electoral and several other modes of political participation. Her
descriptive analyses even indicate that the so-called gender gap revolves among the
youngest cohorts in Western Europe for different political activities (Ibid., 104). Yet
again, none of these studies mobilises longitudinal data to compare over time and/or
distinguish between generational, age and period effects. A notable exception is
Stolle and Hooghe’s study (2011). Nonetheless, they focus on age and therefore life-
cycle effects. In this article, I claim that there may be some evolution over time in
women’s political behaviour that might have nothing to do with age effects. For this
reason, comparisons over time are crucial to disentangling whether certain political
behaviours are explained by certain events in national politics (period effects) and
do not correspond to a durable phenomenon. On the contrary, one might think that
the patterns of political activity of a certain birth cohort differ significantly from that
of older birth cohorts all other things being equal. In the latter case, I speak of a
cohort pattern since it concerns a whole birth cohort and differentiates them from
others. Comparisons over time allow identifying social change and generational
replacement as one of the greatest forces for change.
Concerning the explanation of participatory gender inequalities, existing accounts
point in general to structural inequalities, such as women’s and men’s different
levels of decisive socioeconomic resources (like education, income, occupation,
time, and civic skills) as well as to their different cognitive orientations towards
politics, like political interest, knowledge, and efficacy (Welch 1977; Schlozman
et al. 1994; Verba et al. 1997; Burns et al. 2001; Hooghe and Stolle 2004; Norris
et al. 2004). However, as was mentioned above, persisting participatory gender
inequalities are more puzzling than ever at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
Therefore, I argue that they may require different explanatory approaches. Overall, I
claim that explanations of participatory gender inequalities have to be systematically
reviewed and tested given possible inequalities in the apportionment of these key
determinants of political action among different generations as well as in view of the
possibility that they may differently affect women’s and men’s political action
propensity.
Increasing gender equal political action through generational replacement
Generational theories argue that there are substantial differences between genera-
tions since many generations were socialised in contrasting economic, political and
social environments. In turn, this might influence the development of different
values, political attitudes and behaviours (Mannheim 1928; Inglehart 1977,
1990, 1997). In their revised version of modernisation theory, Inglehart and Norris
(2003) assume that structural developments lead to, and interact with, cultural shifts
that, under certain circumstances, impact political behaviour (Ibid., 102f.). They
suggest that social trends such as the expansion of female education and labour
market participation on the one side, and the general decline in religious convictions
(secularisation) as well as the rise of emancipatory values of postmaterialism on the
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other side, have contributed to greater gender equality. This cultural process is
sustained by generational replacement. Women from younger generations should be
much less likely to perceive politics as a man’s domain since they are expected to be
more educated, more active, less religious and to hold less traditional view of gender
roles. Participatory gender differences might thus gradually decrease over time due
to modernisation developments and generational replacement in post-industrial
societies. Therefore, the main claim of this article is that generational change may
have major consequences for the evolution of participatory gender inequalities in
political action across Europe. If women from more recent birth cohorts acquire
greater predispositions for political action because of their educational attainments,
labour market participation, and higher psychological political involvement, they
might be equally politically active as men.
Hypothesis 1 Women from younger cohorts are more likely to engage in all three
forms of political action than their older counterparts. Therefore, existing gender
inequalities in political action are partly explained by generational differences.
Gendered generational effects
Inglehart and Norris (2003) argue that modernisation processes impact all citizens
and particularly women. Modernisation processes are coupled with increasing
educational opportunities for women as well as growing female participation in the
labour market. Both are important factors that may have discouraged women from
getting politically involved prior to these changes. Therefore, generational
belonging should affect women’s propensity for protest activism more than men’s.
Hypothesis 2 Generational belonging has a differential effect on the likelihood of
women and men to participate in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts. Belonging
to older birth cohorts has a stronger negative effect for women than for men.
Generational differences and gendered effects on key determinants
of political action
Structural and political determinants of political action may explain the hypoth-
esised generational differences in protest activism. Overall, Western European
women from younger cohorts have greater access to (secondary) education, to
resources through their increased labour market participation and they live in less
religious societies. In line with ‘‘cognitive engagement theory’’ (Dalton 2004), more
educated women from younger birth cohorts should also understand and process
information on complex political issues and decisions more easily than their older
counterparts. Since the generational educational and labour market participation
differentiation for women is much stronger than for men, one could argue that
education and labour market participation should have a stronger effect on women’s
political action propensity than on men’s.
Hypothesis 3 Women from younger cohorts are more likely to take part in
different forms of political action than their older counterparts because of their
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relative advantage with regard to structural factors (education; labour market
participation; religiousness).
Hypothesis 3a Higher levels of education increase women’s likelihood of
engaging in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts more strongly than men’s.
Hypothesis 3b Labour market participation increases women’s likelihood of
engaging in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts more strongly than men’s.
In addition to generational and gender differences in these structural factors,
political or cultural factors should also be accounted for. Cultural explanations argue
that differences in resources are not the unique determinant of women’s and men’s
political engagement: political attitudes, values, and ideological beliefs motivate
people to mobilise into political action. Those political factors influence citizens,
independently from their relative social and economic backgrounds.Moreover, people
with lower politicisation predispositions may simply not want to take part in political
life (Verba et al. 1995). Considering the evolution of female political rights, female
political representation, as well as the increasing legitimacy for women to speak out in
public, onemight argue that younger generations of women do not perceive politics as
amen’s business anymore andmight feel more legitimate than their older counterparts
to talk about politics. Therefore, compositional differences in politicisation factors
such as ‘‘engaging in political discussions’’ or ‘‘politically leaning to the left’’ might
explain cohort differences in political action levels. Furthermore, there should be a
differential effect of such politicisation factors, meaning that they should have a
stronger impact onwomen’s political action propensity thanmen’s. In the same vein, a
further explanatory factor is the emergence of new, different values. Inglehart and
Norris (2003) expand Inglehart’s theory on the rise of postmaterialist values in post-
industrial societies (1977, 1990, 1997). This rise is more significant for the youngest
birth cohorts and shapes our understandings of participatory gender inequalities. New
generations of women would therefore be more likely to engage in non-institutional
forms of political participation as well as that they would be more inclined to defend
egalitarian gender roles. Unequal generational apportionment in postmaterialist
values might thus explain generational differences in political action levels.
Additionally, I presume that the emancipatory impact of postmaterialist values might
be stronger for women’s political action potential than for men’s.
Hypothesis 4 Women from younger cohorts are more likely to engage in different
forms of political action than their older counterparts because of their relative
advantage with regard to political factors (levels of politicisation and levels of
postmaterialist values).
Hypothesis 4a Politicisation factors, such as engaging in political discussions and
placing oneself on a left–right scale, increase women’s likelihood of engaging in
demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts more strongly than men’s.
Hypothesis 4b Postmaterialist values increase women’s likelihood of participat-
ing in demonstrations, petitions, and boycotts more strongly than men’s.
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Research design
Two main reasons encourage the choice of France for the analysis of gendered
patterns in protest participation. First, France is known for its historically well-
developed ‘‘protest culture’’. French citizens have, relative to other advanced
Western democracies, an ‘‘above-average’’ propensity to engage in protest (see
Mayer 2013). Second, there is a French specificity when it comes to the relationship
between gender and politics (Achin and Le´veˆque 2006; Sineau 2008). Achin and
Le´veˆque (2006, 24) mention three aspects supporting this distinctiveness in
comparison with other countries. Firstly, there is France’s outstanding time lag of
approximately a century between men’s enfranchisement in 1848 and women’s in
1944. Women’s enfranchisement came more than two decades after most Nordic,
Anglo-Saxon or other continental European countries such as Germany (1919).
Secondly, French feminisms’ relationships to politics are singular. This is illustrated
by the relative weakness of the French suffragist movement as well as the fact that
the majority of French feminists refused to participate in ‘‘conventional’’ politics up
to the 1970s. Thirdly, Achin and Le´veˆque point to the strong and persisting under-
representation of women in the French national parliament since 1945 (ibid.). At the
beginning of 2017, France was still in the 63rd place in a worldwide comparison on
women’s political representation in parliaments with about 26% female represen-
tation in the lower national chamber (IPU 2017). However, some changes have
recently occurred when considering that in 1946, only 5.6% women were present in
the French National Assembly. Forty-seven years later, in 1993, their political
representation had risen to 6.1% (Mossuz-Lavau 2002). Hence, for a very long time,
politics has been almost completely a man’s domain in France (cf. Sineau 2008).
Those two aspects legitimate the choice of France as an interesting case for
analysing cohort differences in participatory gender inequalities over time. Indeed,
one might expect that these contrasting socialisation environments and develop-
ments in the political realm might produce strong differences in political behaviour
among different birth cohorts of French women.
The central aim of this article being to compare gendered patterns of political
action in France across time, a longitudinal data set is in order. The strength of a
longitudinal data set is that individuals are sampled at more than one point in their
life span; therefore, the assessment of any generational impact is made less
problematic than is the case in cross-sectional research designs. Ageing effects are
unavoidably entangled with period and cohort effects in cross-sectional studies. A
cohort is also always a group at a particular stage of the life course (see Pilcher
1994, 488). The European Values Study (EVS) contains repeated measures of
political behaviours, attitudes and beliefs within European societies across several
time points. Additionally, the longitudinal data file of the EVS (2011) covers
27 years, with four different waves for the French case (1981; 1990; 1999; and
2008). It is therefore a well-suited database for the purpose of this study since it
allows us to better analyse and disentangles cohort, life-cycle and period effects.3
3 In comparison, the European Social Survey started only in 2002 and, thus, covers a too short time
period for our analyses (2002–2014).
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As indicated before, this article focuses on the evolution of participatory gender
differences for three distinct forms of political action over time, namely
demonstrating, signing petitions and boycotting. All three variables are polytomous,
indicating whether the respondent (1) ‘‘has done’’, (2) ‘‘might do’’ or (3) ‘‘would
never do’’ any of those political acts. I left demonstrating and petitioning in their
original polytomous coding. However, I had to create a binary measure of
boycotting (combining the categories ‘‘have done’’ and ‘‘might do’’ into one
category) because of the very small proportion of French respondents in the
category ‘‘have done’’. Accordingly, it must be made clear that in the case of
boycotting, the measurement used corresponds to ‘‘boycotting potential’’ since the
answer ‘‘might do’’ implies a certain individual readiness to be mobilised but does
not stand for an actual political behaviour.
The main independent variable of this study is gender. When it comes to
examining gender empirically, we are confronted with some limits of existing
survey data. Traditional understandings of sex dominate measurement practices in
survey research. Most surveys in social sciences, such as the EVS, measure only the
‘‘sex of the respondent’’, and some even conflate the concepts of sex and gender
altogether (see Westbrook and Saperstein 2015). Given the fact that the EVS raises
only a question about the biological sex of respondents, I use sex as a proxy of
gender (see ‘‘Appendix’’ in section). One could argue that I should rather speak of
sexed than gendered patterns of participation. However, using the term gendered
rather than sexed participation allows me to take on an anti-essentialist feminist
point of view. Indeed, gender differences in political action may not be due to
inherent ‘‘natural differences’’ between males and females but rather due to socially
constructed differences between women and men. This implies constructed
identities and assigned behaviours for women and men. In simple terms, gendered
political participation patterns could be nothing else than the result of an unequal
distribution of resources or motivational attitudes between women and men.
Moreover, by using the term gender, I also suggest that what is seen as ‘‘masculine’’
or ‘‘feminine’’ legitimate behaviour differs over time and thus among birth cohorts.
Concerning the conceptualisation and operationalisation of generations, I decided
not to create and regroup ‘‘political generations’’ (see Mannheim 1928; Zukin et al.
2006; Grasso 2016). There are three critical reasons for this choice: first, creating
political generations in a Mannheimian sense would make it necessary to identify the
major historical events that predominated the youth of certain generations. Yet, as
Pilcher (1994, 488) rightly points out: ‘‘There has not been a ‘Wall Street Crash’ in
women’s lives; the changes in women’s lives have not occurred in a sharp, easily
delineated manner, although there have been a number of key events (such as World
War Two) which have punctuated the gradual change’’. Put differently, by focusing
on the socialisation and politicisation of certain social groups, such as women or even
ethnic minorities, one can quickly find several competing ‘‘major key events’’ for
them and thereby several competing ‘‘cutting points’’. It becomes thus impossible to
empiricially account for these ‘‘competing political generations’’. Second, if we
wanted to compare different political generations from different countries, the same
problem with regard to ‘‘cutting points’’ appears. Third, the formation of political
generations ignores gradual change, as Tiberj (2017) points out. Creating cutting
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points with regard to major historical events might omit other minor, low intensity,
but lasting developments in society. Therefore, I follow Tiberj’s approach
(2013, 2017) and ground my cohort cutting points on birth decades. Birth decades
are purely arithmetical, random and hence neutral cutting points. In this way, I
designed six different birth cohorts.4 The operationalisation and coding of the
remaining independent variables are presented in Appendix at the end of this article.
Analytically, this article distinguishes between possible compositional and
conditional effects of explanatory variables (see Fontana et al. 2006). Compositional
effects mean that inequalities in participation levels among women and men as well
as different generations may be explained in terms of the different apportionments
of an explanatory variable among women and men or generations. A conditional
effect refers to a differential effect of an explanatory variable for a certain subgroup.
Methodologically, gender and generational effects are tested in nested and
separated multinomial (demonstrating, petitioning) and binomial logistic (boycott
potential) regression models for each mode of participation and by gender. More
precisely, I control step by step for the significant effect of generational belonging
on three different forms of political activism for French women and men. If
women’s or men’s belonging to a certain birth cohort has, ceteris paribus, a
statistically significant effect on a certain form of political participation, one can
argue that cohorts participate politically in a significantly different way. Otherwise,
it may not be generational belonging that matters. Other aspects related to a certain
period or to compositional effects would therefore make succeeding cohorts behave
differently (see Tiberj 2013, 756ff). Hence, this study uses separated regression
models to compare the hypothesised conditional and compositional effects of
different explanatory variables on women’s and men’s propensity to contribute in
political activism. This approach improves our understanding of the sources of
participatory gender inequalities.
Gender, cohorts, and political participation: empirical results
As shown in Fig. 1, in 1981 in France, demonstrating used to be a male-dominated
activity, with a significant 17-point gap with women: 36% of men in contrast to 18%
of women reported having already participated in a demonstration. This finding
corresponds to the results of the seminal ‘‘Political Action Study’’ from Barnes et al.
(1979). Barnes et al.’s measure of ‘‘protest potential’’ was positively associated with
being a man (Barnes et al. 1979, 106ff). They were the first to reveal gender
differences in political activism because until then, they had solely been established
for institutional forms of political participation (Duverger 1955; Verba et al. 1978).
Gender differences in demonstrating were greater than 10 percentage points in
France until the end of the 1990s. In 2008, these proportions were about 47 and
43%, respectively, showing a much smaller and non-significant gender difference of
4 Two exceptions with regard to cutting points had to be made for the first (1930 and before) and last
birth cohort (1971 and after). In their case, any smaller regrouping was problematic in terms of numbers
of respondents. The number of respondents from birth cohorts 1910–1920 was already very small in 1990,
and the same applies of course in an inverse sense for the cohort 1980–1990.
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about four points. Participatory gender differences in the ‘‘would never do’’
category eroded from a 20-point difference in 1981 to a difference of five points in
2008, with still slightly but significantly more women indicating that they ‘‘would
never do’’ demonstrations in France.5 However over time, there has been a
continuous erosion of gender inequalities in actual participating levels as well as in
levels of refusal to participate in demonstrations among women and men in France.
In contrast to demonstrating, the act of signing a petition is rather an individual
mode of non-institutional political action. Prior research on participatory gender
differences indicated that women prefer this kind of action since it can be done in a
private realm and may be easily integrated in an everyday routine (Coffe´ and
Bolzendahl 2010; Micheletti and Stolle 2006). Figure 2 illustrates that this has not
always been the case. In the 1980s in France, men were also more involved than
women in petitioning. In 1981, about 50% of men compared with 41% of women
reported having already signed a petition: a significant nine-point difference. These
gender differences equalised by the 1990s and even reversed by 2008, with French
women being slightly more active than men in petitioning (65% of men vs. 70% of
women). Hence, a reversion of participatory gender differences in petitioning is
occurring in France.
Concerning the evolution of participatory gender inequalities in potential boycott
engagement (see Fig. 3), the empirical evidence for France challenges the dominant
characterisation of political consumption as a ‘‘women-friendly way’’ of politically
participating derived from the political consumerism literature (see Stolle et al.
2005; Stolle and Micheletti 2006; Coffe´ and Bolzendahl 2010). It seems that pooled
analyses (Coffe´ and Bolzendahl 2010) or studies that focus too much on Northern
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Fig. 1 Evolution of the proportions of French women and men who have participated in demonstrations.
Data: EVS 1981–2008, not weighted
5 Due to lack of space, results for the ‘‘would never do category’’ are not shown but available on request.
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consumerism is a much less widespread and not necessarily a more ‘‘women-
friendly way’’ of political participation in France. As shown in Fig. 3, gender
differences in boycotting are decreasing rather slowly and are still not closing down.
In 2008, a significant eight-point gap remains, with 69% of men and 61% of women
indicating that they would potentially contribute in boycotts. These results confirm
Yates (2011). He found striking disparities between European countries with regard
to participation levels in boycotting and buycotting. According to him, the trend of
reversed gender differences in participation levels in political consumerism ‘‘is
confined to certain countries, and applies much less to boycotting. Habitual
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Fig. 2 Evolution of the proportions of French women and men who have participated in signing












Fig. 3 Evolution of the proportions of French women and men who potentially participated in boycotts.
Data: EVS 1981–2008, not weighted
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buycotting, to a greater extent than boycotting, more politically accessible for
women than for men’’ (2011, 213). In line with Yates, one could argue that in
contrast to boycotting, buycotting is a more individual mode of political action since
it implies an individual labelling scheme rather than a social movement or other
political collective organisations which pull people into action. Yet, one will hardly
find a label on a product that says ‘‘don’t by me’’. People get ‘‘boycott information’’
mostly through non-governmental organisations or social movements. Research on
civic associations has shown that there also exist important participatory gender
inequalities. Women are not only less involved than men in civic associations in
some countries, but more significantly their civic engagement suffers from strong
sexual segregation (Norris and Inglehart 2006; Re´tif 2010). While men tend to
engage more in political groups, women seem to engage more in religious or
charity-like organisations (Ibid.). These gender differences could explain why
gender differences in boycotting persist in France.
Overall, the results from these descriptive analyses have shown that participatory
gender inequalities in political action in France are gradually diminishing
(demonstrating, boycotting) over time, or even reversing (petitioning). In the next
section, I will reflect on the driving forces behind this process.
Testing gender and generational effects for participation in demonstrations
Overall, the results from my first regression model on French women’s actual
participation in demonstrations (see Table 1, model 1) are in line with my first
hypothesis. French women from the youngest cohort of the data are on average
significantly more likely to participate in demonstrations than women from the
1961–1970 cohort. With the exception of the 1951–1960 cohort, all other older
women cohorts are on average significantly less likely than the second youngest
generation of the data set (1961–1970) to participate in demonstrations. In addition,
belonging to older cohorts than the reference birth cohort has on average a stronger
negative impact on French women than men. On average, belonging to the pre-war
cohorts of French women reduces by a factor of 5 the chances of participating in
demonstrations (versus a factor of 2.8 for men). This confirms my second
hypothesis.
However, as soon as I control for structural factors (Table 1, model 2), most of
these cohort differences among women turn insignificant. For most of these French
cohorts, gender differences in education, occupational status and religiousness
explain why they are more or less likely to participate in demonstrations. It is thus in
fact the lower levels of education, financial assets, and occupational experiences—
which are all closely associated with political participation—that explain older
female cohort’s lower levels of political engagement. These results point to
compositional effects regarding structural factors and confirm hypothesis 3 for
almost all cohorts with one exception: the ‘‘1930 and before’’ cohort of French
women. Even when controlling for structural and political factors, generational
belonging to this pre-war cohort of French women still reduces by a factor of 2.5 the
chances of participating in demonstrations (versus 1.6 for men). The effect of
A longitudinal analysis of gendered patterns in political… 429
Table 1 Nested multinomial regression models on demonstrating
Demonstrating Model 1 ‘‘have done’’ Model 2 ‘‘have done’’ Model 3 ‘‘have done’’
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Birth cohorts: reference category 1961–1970
Cohort 1930 and before 0.20*** 0.36*** 0.45** 0.69 0.40*** 0.61*
(0.04) (0.07) (0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.14)
Cohort 1931–1940 0.41*** 0.64* 0.86 1.17 0.64 0.99
(0.08) (0.13) (0.19) (0.26) (0.15) (0.23)
Cohort 1941–1950 0.60** 1.17 0.93 1.71* 0.76 1.44
(0.11) (0.24) (0.19) (0.38) (0.17) (0.34)
Cohort 1951–1960 1.08 1.23 1.34 1.42 1.16 1.18
(0.19) (0.24) (0.26) (0.29) (0.24) (0.25)
Cohort 1971 and after 1.73* 2.54*** 1.28 1.87* 1.46 1.88*
(0.38) (0.63) (0.30) (0.49) (0.36) (0.51)
Survey year: ref. cat. 1981
1990 1.36 1.13 1.05 1.07 1.01 1.08
(0.25) (0.20) (0.21) (0.20) (0.22) (0.22)
1999 1.71** 1.28 1.65** 1.27 2.16*** 1.60*
(0.28) (0.21) (0.29) (0.22) (0.42) (0.29)
2008 2.78*** 1.18 2.15*** 1.08 2.56*** 1.44
(0.45) (0.20) (0.39) (0.20) (0.51) (0.29)
Education: ref. cat. completed at 15–17 years
14 years and under 0.80 0.68* 0.89 0.75
(0.15) (0.11) (0.18) (0.13)
18–20 years 2.51*** 1.69** 2.04*** 1.46*
(0.39) (0.29) (0.34) (0.26)
21 years and above 5.59*** 3.76*** 3.53*** 2.59***
(1.08) (0.75) (0.75) (0.55)
Occupation: ref. cat. not in the labour market
Self-employed 1.16 0.84 1.32 0.83
(0.32) (0.23) (0.40) (0.25)
Higher management 2.85*** 1.45 2.10*** 1.11
(0.56) (0.38) (0.45) (0.31)
Employees 1.76** 1.34 1.69** 1.10
(0.29) (0.38) (0.30) (0.33)
Workers 0.97 1.08 1.17 0.94
(0.20) (0.28) (0.26) (0.26)
Religious 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.81 0.77
(0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10)




belonging to this pre-war cohort is persistently stronger for French women than
men, which again confirms partly my hypothesis 2: generational belonging clearly
matters more for women’s than for men’s likeliness to participate in protests.
Moreover, I do not observe exactly the same generational patterns for French
women and men in the case of demonstrating. The ‘‘pre-war cohort effect’’ is
somewhat less persistent for men. More interestingly, there is a persistent positive
effect of belonging to the youngest birth cohort in the case of French men. French
men who were born in ‘‘1971 and after’’ are on average continuously more likely
than men from the 1961–1970 birth cohort to participate in demonstrations, all else
being equal.
In Table 1 model 2, I observe significant and positive effects of education for
both women and men in France. In line with my hypothesis 3a however, the effect
of higher education is much stronger for women than men. Having a very high
level of education increases on average the odds of French women participating in
demonstrations by about 5.6 times (versus by about 3.8 times for French men) at
equal levels of occupational situation and religiousness. More importantly, in
contrast to men, there is a significant positive ‘‘job effect’’ for women’s protest
propensity. Working as an employee or in higher management rather than not
being in the labour market increases women’s odds of going to a demonstration by
about 1.8 and 2.9 times. This confirms hypothesis 3b. Thus, this result points to the
positive and mobilising effect of women’s participation in the workforce
providing women with the necessary assets for political involvement.
Table 1 continued
Demonstrating Model 1 ‘‘have done’’ Model 2 ‘‘have done’’ Model 3 ‘‘have done’’
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Frequently 8.97*** 5.98***
(2.18) (1.41)










N 2309 2204 2309 2204 2309 2204
Pseudo R2 6.22 3.37 12.40 6.98 18.95 12.77
Interpretation The reference category for the dependent variable is ‘‘never’’. Results for the ‘‘might do’’
category have been omitted but are available on request. The coefficients are relative risk ratios. Standard
errors in parentheses. N has been restricted in order to make models comparative. Data are not weighted
*** p\ 0.001; ** p\ 0.01; * p\ 0.05
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Nevertheless, an important qualification has to be made: the positive job effect
seems to be confined to rather high-level jobs. Women who work as workers or
who are self-employed do not have a significantly higher protest propensity than
women who are not in paid work.
Model 3 of Table 1 shows that French women who frequently discuss political
matters are on average more than nine times as likely to engage in demonstrations
than women who never do so, all else being equal. Men who also frequently talk
about politics are only six times as likely to demonstrate than men who never do
so. There is clearly a stronger positive politicisation effect of political discussions
for women. This confirms hypothesis 4a. Similarly, postmaterialist values also
have a stronger positive effect on French women’s propensity to demonstrate than
men’s (confirming hypothesis 4b). The quest for emancipation which is intrinsic to
postmaterialist values clearly does more heavily influence women’s readiness for
voicing their political interests or beliefs in protests.
Finally, it should be noted that since the end of the 1990s, there is a positive and
significant period effect for women’s propensity to engage in demonstrations, while
this is not the case for men. It seems thus that time has played a significant role for
women’s increasing demonstrating activity in France.
Testing gender and generational effects for participation in petitions
The results for actual engagement in petitions (Table 2) are somewhat similar to
those for demonstrating in the case of women and generational effects. The results
from Table 2 model 1 seem to be again in line with my first hypothesis: French
women from the youngest cohort of the data set are more than twice as likely to file
a petition (rather than never doing it) than women from the 1961–1970 cohort. And
while the 1951–1960 and 1941–1950 cohorts are as likely as the second youngest
generation of French women of this study to engage in petitioning, this is not the
case for the two oldest cohorts. The latter are significantly less likely than the
second youngest generation to file a petition.
As we can see in the second model of Table 2, the negative effect of belonging
to the 1931–1940 cohort for women’s protest propensity turns insignificant as soon
as we control for structural factors. This confirms hypothesis 3 for this cohort in
the case of petitioning. Once again, the oldest pre-war generation of French
women is in comparison with their second youngest counterpart persistently less
likely to actually file a petition rather than never doing so, all else being equal.
More importantly, in contrast to the results for demonstrating, there is also a
persistent positive effect for belonging to the youngest generation of French
women of our data set: women who were born in 1971 or after are on average
approximately twice as likely as women who were born between 1961–1970 to
actually file a petition, all else being equal. So, we can only partly confirm my
hypothesis 3 since I am unable to fully account for the participatory differences
between the youngest, oldest and second youngest French female birth cohorts of
the data set.
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Table 2 Nested multinomial regression models on petitioning
Petitioning Model 1 ‘‘have done’’ Model 2 ‘‘have done’’ Model 3 ‘‘have done’’
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Birth cohorts: reference category 1961–1970
Cohort 1930 and before 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.58* 0.68 0.56* 0.65
(0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.20) (0.15) (0.19)
Cohort 1931–1940 0.52** 0.61 0.96 1.13 0.83 1.01
(0.12) (0.16) (0.24) (0.32) (0.22) (0.30)
Cohort 1941–1950 0.98 1.12 1.40 1.67 1.27 1.45
(0.24) (0.31) (0.36) (0.50) (0.33) (0.44)
Cohort 1951–1960 1.04 1.09 1.16 1.19 1.06 1.09
(0.23) (0.28) (0.27) (0.32) (0.25) (0.30)
Cohort 1971 and after 2.43** 1.24 1.95 0.90 2.21* 0.85
(0.82) (0.40) (0.67) (0.30) (0.78) (0.29)
Survey year: ref. cat. 1981
1990 1.49* 1.11 1.27 1.03 1.24 1.01
(0.29) (0.23) (0.26) (0.22) (0.26) (0.23)
1999 2.29*** 2.21*** 2.29*** 2.21*** 2.67*** 2.74***
(0.42) (0.45) (0.44) (0.47) (0.53) (0.61)
2008 2.77*** 1.64* 2.27*** 1.51 2.50*** 1.93**
(0.52) (0.35) (0.45) (0.34) (0.51) (0.46)
Education: ref. cat. completed at 15–17 years
14 years and under 0.76 0.54** 0.82 0.61*
(0.14) (0.11) (0.16) (0.13)
18–20 years 1.85*** 1.41 1.50* 1.17
(0.34) (0.31) (0.29) (0.26)
21 years and above 3.13*** 3.06*** 1.94* 2.05*
(0.80) (0.84) (0.52) (0.58)
Occupation: ref. cat. not in the labour market
Self-employed 1.03 0.71 1.06 0.64
(0.27) (0.23) (0.30) (0.21)
Higher management 2.75*** 1.93* 2.13** 1.56
(0.67) (0.61) (0.54) (0.52)
Employees 2.11*** 1.82 2.06*** 1.56
(0.39) (0.62) (0.39) (0.55)
Workers 1.12 1.45 1.27 1.35
(0.23) (0.45) (0.27) (0.43)
Religious 0.72* 0.74* 0.85 0.84
(0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Political discussions: ref. cat. never
Occasionally 2.33*** 3.82***
(0.35) (0.64)
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Furthermore, hypothesis 2 is only partly confirmed. The first model of Table 2
shows that there are almost no significant negative generational effects for men’s
propensity to sign a petition but for the oldest pre-war cohort of French men. Indeed,
we observe a similar strong negative effect of belonging to this generation for
French women and men: on average, belonging to the oldest pre-war cohort reduces
for men on average the chances of signing a petition by a factor of about 3 (3.3 for
women). In contrast to their female counterpart, their different petition propensities
can be explained through generational differences in apportionment of structural
factors.
In contrast to the results of demonstrating, hypothesis 3a can only be partly
confirmed. While having a higher level of education only has a significant positive
effect on women’s propensity to sign a petition, the positive effects of a very high
level of education on petitioning are somewhat similar for French women and
men. However, as in the case of demonstrating, we can again detect a significant
and positive job effect for French women who work as an employee or in higher
management compared to women who are not in the labour market, while there
are again no noteworthy significant job effects for men’s likeliness to sign a
petition.
The results from the third model of Table 2 confirm hypotheses 4a and 4b. As
in the case of demonstrating, frequently discussing political affairs and acquiring
emancipating postmaterialist values have a stronger effect on French women’s
Table 2 continued
Petitioning Model 1 ‘‘have done’’ Model 2 ‘‘have done’’ Model 3 ‘‘have done’’
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Frequently 6.36*** 4.37***
(2.24) (1.25)










N 2329 2210 2329 2210 2329 2210
Pseudo R2 4.60 2.83 8.80 6.11 12.37 10.91
Interpretation The reference category for the dependent variable is ‘‘never’’. Results for the ‘‘might do’’
category have been omitted but are available on request. The coefficients are relative risk ratios. Standard
errors in parentheses. N has been restricted in order to make models comparative. Data are not weighted
*** p\ 0.001; ** p\ 0.01; * p\ 0.05
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likeliness to sign a petition in comparison with men. Moreover, time has again
played a significant role for women’s increasing involvement in petitioning in
France, as confirms the strong positive period effect. While there is also a
significant and positive period effect for men, it is not as strong in the case of
women.
Testing gender and generational effects for potential participation
in boycotts
Finally, the results for my measurement of French citizens’ boycott potential
(Table 3) are quite different with regard to generational effects.
First of all, results from the second and third model in Table 3 illustrate that
once I control for the level of education, professional activity, political attitudes,
religiosity and postmaterialist values, belonging to the youngest birth cohort has a
significant negative effect on French women’s boycott potential. This means that
women who belong to the ‘‘1971 and after’’ cohort are on average about 1.5 times
less likely to potentially engage in boycotts than the second youngest cohort of
this study, all else being equal. Therefore, in the case of boycott engagement I
clearly cannot confirm my first hypothesis. While I observed a rather linear pattern
in the case of demonstrations and petitions, with an increased readiness for
participation in successive female birth cohorts, there is no such linear pattern in
the case of boycott activities. I would like to emphasise that this result may be
explained by the different, more collective nature of boycotts in comparison with
buycotts.
Concerning the comparison of generational effects, we can observe that the
negative effect of belonging to the two oldest generations on boycott potential is not
much stronger for women in comparison with men. Furthermore, once structural
and political control variables are introduced, belonging to the oldest birth cohort
appears to have a slightly stronger negative effect on French men than women. That
said, there are stronger negative and significant effects of belonging to the
1941–1950 as well as the youngest birth cohort for women compared to men. This
lower propensity of the youngest birth cohort of French women to be potentially
involved in boycotts in comparison with their older counterparts, all else being
equal, cannot be confirmed in the case of men and is particularly intriguing. I can
therefore only partly confirm my second hypothesis.
Moreover, in contrast to the results for the acts of demonstrating and petitioning,
existing generational differences in the case of boycotts are not explained by
structural or political factors. They remain significant. Therefore, I cannot confirm
my hypotheses 3 and 4 for boycott activities.
Once again, I detect a stronger positive effect of higher and very high levels of
education on women’s boycott potential, confirming hypothesis 3a. Similarly, I do
not detect any significant job effect for men’s boycott potential, whereas there is
again a significant positive effect of high-level jobs for their female counterparts
(confirming my hypothesis 3b). In addition, in line with hypotheses 4a and 4b, the
results from the third model of Table 3 confirm that frequently engaging in political
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Table 3 Nested logistic regression models on boycotting
Boycotting potential Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Birth cohorts: reference category 1961–1970
Cohort 1930 and before 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.42*** 0.29*** 0.39*** 0.24***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Cohort 1931–1940 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.66* 0.59** 0.53*** 0.49***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
Cohort 1941–1950 0.50*** 0.72* 0.71* 0.96 0.62** 0.80
(0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.17) (0.11) (0.15)
Cohort 1951–1960 0.80 1.09 0.89 1.23 0.79 1.10
(0.12) (0.18) (0.14) (0.20) (0.13) (0.19)
Cohort 1971 and after 0.85 1.41 0.63** 1.09 0.67* 1.09
(0.14) (0.26) (0.11) (0.21) (0.12) (0.22)
Survey year: ref. cat. 1981
1990 0.90 1.16 0.73* 1.10 0.66* 1.13
(0.13) (0.18) (0.12) (0.18) (0.11) (0.20)
1999 0.89 0.95 0.79 0.91 0.86 1.03
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.16)
2008 1.48** 1.04 1.19 0.95 1.27 1.12
(0.19) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19)
Education: ref. cat. completed at 15–17 years
14 years and under 0.64** 0.71* 0.68* 0.78
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12)
18–20 years 1.73*** 1.52** 1.45** 1.34*
(0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19)
21 years and above 3.46*** 2.74*** 2.39*** 1.99***
(0.53) (0.44) (0.39) (0.34)
Occupation: ref. cat. not in the labour market
Self-employed 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.74
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Higher management 1.76*** 1.38 1.39* 1.15
(0.28) (0.29) (0.23) (0.25)
Employees 1.20 1.33 1.15 1.20
(0.16) (0.31) (0.16) (0.29)
Workers 0.79 0.99 0.88 0.92
(0.13) (0.21) (0.15) (0.20)
Religious 0.64*** 0.61*** 0.80* 0.66***
(0.62) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)




discussions and possessing emancipating postmaterialist values have a stronger
positive effect on French women’s boycott potential than on men’s.
Conclusion
This article tested participatory gender and generational differences in political
action over time, using longitudinal EVS data on France. Some important
contributions have been emphasised.
First of all, the longitudinal research design shows an erosion of gender
differences in non-institutional political participation in France. Gender differ-
ences in petitioning have not only equalised but even slightly reversed over time.
This result confirms the arguments developed by feminist scholars who argue that
women do not so much participate less but differently than men (see Coffe´ and
Bolzendahl 2010). Nevertheless, being a woman still has a small but persistent
negative impact in the cases of demonstrating and boycotting in France.6
Participatory gender differences for these two types of political engagement
Table 3 continued
Boycotting potential Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Women Men Women Men Women Men
Frequently 3.75*** 3.32***
(0.69) (0.62)










N 2239 2128 2239 2128 2239 2128
Pseudo R2 5.74 8.42 13.70 13.64 20.66 19.51
Interpretation The reference category for the dependent variable is ‘‘never’’. The coefficients are odds
ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. N has been restricted in order to make models comparative. Data
are not weighted
*** p\ 0.001; ** p\ 0.01; * p\ 0.05
6 This has been tested by using the same regression models but not separating for women and men and
introducing the variable gender instead (results not shown).
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cannot solely be explained by generational differences. Gender still matters for
engagement in protests and boycotts in France.
Secondly, the results highlight the strength of a more nuanced quantitative
research design. The individual analysis of participatory gender differences in three
different forms of political action shows its conditionality depending on how one
distinguishes between different forms of political participation. Furthermore, by
separately modelling and analysing three distinct forms of political action for
women and men, we can observe that generational belonging as well as educational
attainment, occupation, levels of politicisation and postmaterialist values do not
have the same impact on French women’s and men’s activism propensity. This is an
important empirical result that reinforces the significance of gender sensitive
theoretical explanations. Moreover, it confirms the relevance of analytically
distinguishing between compositional and conditional effects.
Thirdly, in line with other research, this longitudinal analysis mostly confirms that
post-war birth cohorts—but not necessarily the youngest—are the motor behind the
rise of different forms of non-institutional political participation in France (Tiberj
2017).
Fourthly, many generational differences can be explained by structural factors.
Put differently, most of the observed differences in participation levels between
women from older and younger cohorts were explained by the fact that these
generations differ in levels of education, occupational status and religiousness.
Yet, there are some notable exceptions: the youngest French female generation of
the data set is, ceteris paribus, more likely to sign a petition but less likely to
engage in boycotts than their older counterparts. In addition, structural and
political factors could not explain the persistently negative effect of generational
belonging to the oldest pre-war cohort both in the case of French women and men.
Where do we go from here? I argue that gender and generational differences
should be analysed in further contexts, to find out whether their participation
patterns are similar to those of France’s. I believe that more comparative research
for gendered political action is needed. While existing research widely recognises
political participation as a context-dependent phenomenon (Dalton et al. 2010;
Hooghe and Quintelier 2014; Vra´blı´kova´ 2014), the analysis of contextual factors
remains still rare in the study of participatory gender inequalities (Desposato and
Norrander 2008; Karp and Banducci 2008). More longitudinal research is needed
in order to learn how contextual arrangements interact with age, period and cohort
effects.
Additionally, analyses with more recent longitudinal data are needed in order to
find out more on the evolution of participatory gender inequalities in the European
postcrisis environment. EVS data ends in 2008 and Inglehart’s and Norris’ theory
(2003) did not take into account a potential materialist backlash triggered by an
economic crisis.
Finally, we need more qualitative investigations to examine the reasons for
women’s greater engagement in petitioning as well as to find out more about the
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different logics of boycotting and buycotting that make men apparently more likely
to engage in the first and women more likely to engage in the latter.
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Appendix
Variable Description Range
Sex Sex of respondent is used as a proxy for gender since the EVS





Education ‘‘age when education completed’’
(1) ‘‘14 years and less’’
(2) ‘‘15–17 years’’
(3) ‘‘18–20 years’’
(4) ‘‘21 years and more’’
1 (min.)–4
(max.)




(5) regrouping all groups which are not in the labour market
1 (min.)–5
(max.)
Political discussions Used as a proxy for the individual degree of politicisation
The EVS asks respondents whether they discuss:
(1) ‘‘frequently’’, (2) ‘‘occasionally’’ or (3) ‘‘never’’ matters of
politics with friends and colleagues
Variable has been recorded so that higher values indicate a





Used as a second proxy of the degree of individual
politicisation
EVS asks its respondent to place their political views on a
scale that goes from 1 (very left)–10 (very right)
Recoded into three categories: 1–4 ‘‘left leaning’’, 6–10 ‘‘right




Religiousness A dummy variable out of two measures was created
The first question asks respondents whether they belong to a
religious denomination
The second question asks if the person considers him/herself
as a religious person
The variable indicates (1) when someone belongs to a
religious denomination or describes himself as religious; (0)
stands for people who do not belong to a religious
denomination or describe themselves as not religious
0 (min.)–1
(max.)
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Variable Description Range
Postmaterialist values Postmaterialist values are measured by the EVS’s 4-item scale
on postmaterialism:
There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this
country should be for the next ten years. On this card are
listed some of the goals which different people would give
top priority. If you had to choose, which of the things on this
card would you say is most important? And which would be
the next most important? 1) Maintaining order in the nation;
2) giving people more say in important government
decisions 3) fighting rising prices; 4) protecting freedom of
speech
If a person chose twice the same materialistic (1/1 or 3/3) or
postmaterialistic (2/2 or 4/4) aim, he or she was coded as
materialistic (1) or postmaterialist (3) person. Otherwise
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